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In 1976 C.P. Stacey issued A Very Double Life: The Private World of Mackenzie King. Based 
on King’s recently-opened diaries, the book 
startled many Canadians. Seen by many as a 
dull man prone to bouts of meandering verbosity, 
instead Canadians discovered the outwardly 
drab King in fact had been “an inhabitant of 
two worlds”: a careful statesman immersed in 
the “very practical world of politics and public 
affairs”; and a quixotic figure fascinated by the 
occult, an embarrassing devotee to his mother, 
and a possible procurer of prostitutes. The 
diary, which begins in 1893 and ends in July 
1950, as Stacey avers, is “the most important 
single political document on twentieth-century 
Canadian history.”1 But while many focus on the 
diary’s more salacious details, this article will use 
the diary to study King’s part in sending 5,000 
Canadian soldiers to participate an American-led 
assault upon the Japanese-held island of Kiska in 
the Aleutian archipelago in August 1943. King’s 
role is important for several reasons. First, as 
J.L. Granatstein notes, King utterly dominated 
his government, especially in the Second World 
War when his Cabinet had no more than four or 
five truly effective ministers amidst a “cabinet 
table...surrounded by more than a few genuine 
mediocrities, political hacks, and patronage 
seekers.” Further, as a Liberal steeped in the 
19th-century British tradition, King’s political 
watchwords were caution, balance, pessimism, 
and distrust of the military profession. As he 
told a visiting British diplomat in May 1938, “his 
experience of political life had taught him that any 
success he had attained had been due far more 
to avoiding action rather than taking action.”2 
Unlike the European theatre of operations, where 
hundreds of thousands of Canadian personnel 
had been handed over to Allied control with 
little real debate, King and his Cabinet War 
Committee (CWC) enjoyed absolute discretion 
employing Greenlight Force, the Canadian 
brigade group sent to the Aleutians. Through 
King’s diary we can follow, from inception to 
conclusion, the political imperatives behind an 
optional military operation. Ever keen to limit 
Canada’s military liabilities, King only reluctantly 
accepted a Kiska role for fear relations with the 
United States would suffer if he had declined. 
Understandably concerned about the quality 
of military advice after catastrophic defeats at 
Hong Kong in December 1941 and at Dieppe 
in August 1942, the CWC severely restricted 
the military’s freedom of action in establishing 
Greenlight Force. Nevertheless, things did not go 
as expected. After risking considerable political 
capital, King gained little when 35,000 Allied 
troops landed on Kiska only to find its Japanese 
occupiers had covertly evacuated three weeks 
before. Thus when Winston Churchill told King 
in September 1944 Canada could secure a place 
in future operations “along the Aleutian islands 
and the Kuriles,” the Canadian leader acidly 
rejoined he “did not wish our men assigned to 
any second Kiska role.” If Canadian troops had 
to fight in the Pacific, King wanted them to do 
so in highly visible and important regions like 
Formosa, Japan, and the Philippines.3
The roots of the Kiska operation lie in King’s 
concern about home defence, a concern that 
predated the Second World War. Though Stacey 
has argued King’s martial disinterest was so 
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6marked he “would have understood those Chinese 
intellectuals, who, we are told, regard soldiers 
as an inferior race whose proceedings deserve 
only the contempt of civilized men,” recent 
scholarship asserts King supported rearmament 
after 1935 to protect Canada against American 
encroachment in the event of a war between 
Japan and the United States.4 Such concerns 
had emerged early. When Wilfrid Laurier created 
a Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in 1910 to deflect 
demands for a Canadian contribution to the 
Royal Navy, Minister of Labour King noted while 
ships on the west coast “would be best from the 
point of real efficiency to the Empire,” they would 
“be unpopular in Quebec & the East.” Ten years 
later when Admiral Viscount Jellicoe suggested 
fielding 15 Canadian warships in the Pacific, as 
opposition leader King thought Canada should 
“recognize an obligation to coast defence, & to 
the British Navy.” But after coming to power, 
in the wake of the Anglo-Japanese alliance’s 
replacement by multinational agreements 
limiting Pacific naval armaments in 1922, Prime 
Minister King cut the navy to just two destroyers.5
When King nervously attended his first imperial 
conference in 1923, determined British attempts 
to centralize the empire’s foreign and defence 
policies made little headway. King greatly 
distrusted imperialists, while his minority 
government rested upon a shaky concord 
between isolationist French Canadians and anti-
militarist Progressives. Arguing Canada had 
never brought the empire into a conflict and 
likely would never do so given its geographical 
isolation and good relations with America, 
King won the hard-fought concession that each 
Dominion’s primary military responsibility was 
home defence despite vehement Australian 
opposition.6 Even after gaining a firm majority in 
1935, King told Parliament in 1936 with “respect 
to all the great issues that come up,” Canada’s 
first duty to the empire and the League of Nations 
was “to keep this country united.” After 1937, 
though King knew Canada would support Britain 
against Germany, he would not commit lest an 
emboldened British government would adopt a 
hard anti-German line that instead might bring 
on a conflict. When he approved rearmament in 
1936–37, King was less interested in European 
security than he was in safeguarding British 
Columbia in the wake of Franklin Roosevelt’s 
comments that America might intervene if 
Canada could not rebuff Japanese aggression.7 
In September 1939 King sought a war of limited 
liability that emphasized air power and economic 
production. But when Canada’s military pushed 
for an expeditionary force for Europe, Under 
Secretary of State for External Affairs O.D. 
Skelton emphasized home defence, arguing “we 
cannot in this war ignore the Pacific as we did 
in the last.” General H.D.G. Crerar, Chief of the 
General Staff (CGS), believed any diversion of 
resources to the Pacific might lose the European 
war. Intent on building a formidable Canadian 
army that would play a major role in defeating 
Germany, Crerar told Minister of National 
Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King only reluctantly 
accepted a role for Canada in the Kiska operation for 
fear that relations with the United States would suffer if 
he declined.
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7Defence J.L. Ralston in July 1940 the risk of 
Japan attacking Canada was quite low. Further, 
as Canada could rely on American intervention in 
the event of Japanese aggression, it did not need 
substantial home defence forces. King’s consent 
in mid-August 1940 to Roosevelt’s suggestion of 
a Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence (PJBD) to coordinate continental defence 
only enhanced the drive to build a “big army” in 
Britain now that Canada itself seemed secure. 
As negotiations between America and Japan 
ominously stalled in late 1941, Canada had just 
six infantry battalions, 25 warplanes, and three 
minesweepers in British Columbia.8
This did not mean that King was sanguine about 
the strategic situation in the Pacific. In August 
1940 he told Britain’s High Commissioner 
that Canada might remain neutral in an Anglo-
Japanese war so as not to injure Anglo-American 
relations, adding ominously that Canada’s Pacific 
coast was “wholly undefended.” Yet when he met 
Japan’s Minister on 7 September, with no Britons 
present, King took a harder line. After Baron 
Tomei complained America’s possession of the 
Philippines, Hawaii, and the Aleutian Islands 
menaced Japan, King insisted Canadians were 
“prepared to fight in any quarter of the globe 
where the British Empire was threatened.” 
Then in October, when invited to participate in 
a Singapore-based conference about defence 
cooperation in the south Pacific, against Skelton’s 
desires King sent an observer though he agreed 
with Skelton that Canada should not send military 
forces to the region.9 Japan’s surprise December 
1941 offensive changed much. Despite prompt 
military assurances that British Columbia faced 
only minor Japanese raids, cabinet minister 
T.A. Crerar told journalist Grant Dexter on 8 
December 1941 that King wanted two divisions 
stationed in British Columbia. Crerar had not 
exaggerated. Called from a Cabinet meeting on 
9 December to receive word of the United States 
Navy’s (USN) stunning losses at Pearl Harbor, a 
shocked King worried that a Japanese assault 
upon Canada’s west coast “seemed wholly 
probable.” Desperate to prevent any diversion of 
limited resources to home defence, on 10 and 11 
December Canada’s chiefs of staff advised that 
whilst recent Allied defeats had adversely altered 
the Pacific’s strategic balance in favour of Japan, 
Germany constituted the greatest long term 
military threat and it remained “vitally important 
to ensure that attention is not unduly diverted 
Air Marshal Lloyd S. Breadner, Rear-Admiral Percy W. Nelles and Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, the Canadian 
chiefs of staff, at the Quebec Conference. There was much friction between these senior officers and Prime Minister 
King and his War Cabinet, over the decision to send Canadian troops to the Aleutians.
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8from the Atlantic.” The army offered only 11 
anti-aircraft guns for British Columbia, the RCAF 
just 120 fighter planes; deploying anything more 
to the west coast, army chief General Kenneth 
Stuart argued, would play “into the hands of our 
enemies.”10 
Unconvinced by the military’s case, on 11 
December King noted Japan might “make some 
landing on our coast.” Still, even that dismal 
possibility might work to his advantage as 
Canadians might “not wish to see large numbers 
of our men sent overseas in addition to those 
already there before US troops begin to be landed 
on either British or European soil.” But after 
Singapore’s stunning capture in mid-February, 
and with the Vancouver Sun demanding the flow 
of Canadian soldiers to Europe should cease 
while “the war moves towards Canada across 
the Pacific,” King saw Canada’s generals as his 
greatest immediate foe. He and Stuart argued 
bitterly on 20 February about home defence and 
the Pacific. Convinced that Canada’s military 
saw nothing but the war in Europe, King fretted 
Japan might take India, could knock China from 
the war, and would attack Alaska and possibly 
even British Columbia. Thus, while agreeing to 
hold to the “basic view of defeating enemy in 
Europe as immediate first step,” the CWC paid 
more attention to Canadian defences. A week 
later the prime minister, informing a sympathetic 
Dexter and fellow journalist Bruce Hutchison 
on 27 February that Japan soon would attack 
Alaska and British Columbia, carped about army 
ambitions and advised them “to keep banging 
away at the generals” about home defence. 
The increasingly bitter row finally abated in 
mid-March when Stuart, claiming his job was 
in jeopardy, created three new home defence 
divisions.11
* * * * *
In June 1942 the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) fell into an ambush at Midway Island and lost 
four aircraft carriers. Japan’s sole success in 
an overly complex scheme was its occupation 
of the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian 
chain. Midway’s results can be attributed in large 
part to USN crypto-analysts having deciphered 
IJN plans, but the mad scramble to meet the 
Japanese threat revealed just how poorly 
defended Alaska was. Uncertain whether the 
army air force could reinforce Alaska in time to 
meet the IJN onslaught, US Lieutenant General 
John DeWitt of Western Defense Command, 
which encompassed Alaska and the western 
continental United States, asked Canada’s Pacific 
Command to send two RCAF squadrons to 
Yakutat near Anchorage within 24 hours. DeWitt 
had good reason to expect assistance would be 
forthcoming. The Canadian army had overturned 
a September 1940 PJBD agreement that pledged 
Canadian army, air force, and navy resources to 
Alaskan defence on the grounds that “the political 
need” for Canada to promise some measure of 
assistance to America in the dark days of 1940 
no longer applied in 1941. However, the final joint 
plan ABC–22 of July 1941 committed the RCN 
and RCAF to aid Alaska.12 
On 27 April 1942 the PJBD had agreed to let 
local commanders determine the distribution 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s key advisors: Charles 
G. Power, minister of National Defence for Air; James 
L. Ralston, minister of National Defence; and Angus 
Macdonald, minister of National Defence for Naval 
Services.
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9of west coast air strength. Moreover, Air Vice-
Marshal L.F. Stevenson, the RCAF’s commander 
of Western Air Command, had begun planning to 
transfer planes to Alaska as early as 5 May. But 
the RCAF, which had objected to the PJBD’s April 
decision because it seemed “to place upon Canada 
the onus of providing re-enforcement [sic] in the 
event on an attack upon Alaska,” had convinced 
the CWC on 14 May to restrict warplane transfers 
only to the Alaskan Panhandle. Therefore when 
DeWitt’s request came, Minister of National 
Defence for Air C.G. Power and his staff ruled 
RCAF squadrons would only go to Annette Island 
near the Panhandle’s southern frontier pending 
a possible move to Yakutat.13 DeWitt appealed 
Power’s decision. In temporary command in 
British Columbia, Stuart advised standing firm. 
For his part, Power told King the RCAF squadrons 
should stay at Annette until the “situation 
developed further and [the] purpose of reported 
enemy concentrations more clearly indicated.” 
Switching tactics, DeWitt called upon American 
PJBD member General S.D. Embick to intervene. 
Embick revealed the scope of Japan’s offensive 
to General Maurice Pope, head of Canada’s Joint 
Staff Mission in Washington DC. Though Pope 
doubted the situation was so dire, he counselled 
Embick to speak to Air Commodore H.V. Heakes. 
Making pointed references to ABC–22, Embick 
told Heakes the planes likely would be held 
at Yakutat only until 8 June. Four hours later 
Heakes cabled that the squadrons would be on 
their way to Alaska shortly.14
The RCAF’s official history argues these 
“complicated and occasionally irascible 
negotiations” might have been avoided had 
Canada been kept “fully in the intelligence 
picture.” This greatly overstates the case. 
Certainly America’s military had not revealed all 
it knew about Japan’s intentions, but between 
18 and 30 May it had sent Canada four major 
messages outlining enemy plans. The problem 
was not a shortage of timely information, only that 
Canadian officers did not believe American threat 
assessments. On 28 May, questioning American 
steadiness and intelligence-gathering abilities, 
Pope concurred with a British assertion that 
the USN was overly anxious about the Pacific.15 
Canada’s military confidently had expected 
its new home defence emphasis would defeat 
DeWitt’s request. But King declined to support 
his military again. First, on 1 April Roosevelt 
had indicated the Aleutians could be a vital land 
Prime Minister King (left) meets with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
at the Quebec Conference in August 1943. Standing at the back are (l.-r.) General Henry Arnold, Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles Portal, General Sir Alan Brooke, Admiral Ernest King, General Sir John Dill, General George Marshall, Admiral 
Sir Dudley Pound, Admiral William Leahy.
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10
bridge if the Soviets allowed American bombers 
to use Siberian bases to attack Japan’s home 
islands. But with American forces heavily engaged 
elsewhere, Roosevelt had noted he “might have to 
look to Canada for assistance in securing Alaska 
and the Aleutians.” Then on 15 April, when 
Roosevelt had accentuated Alaska’s vulnerability 
to attack, King had replied he might be able to 
send forces to Alaska “later on.” Moreover, under-
secretary at the Department of External Affairs 
(DEA) since Skelton’s death in January 1941, had 
told King in March that not every allied nation had 
to make its major military effort against Germany. 
For Robertson, an active Canadian role in Alaska 
might balance a politically worrying American 
presence in Canada’s northwest on projects like 
the Alaska Highway.16 Writing to a friend, King 
argued that as Canada might require assistance 
to defend British Columbia:
Not to be able to send planes and ships into 
American territory, as for example Alaska, and 
islands that lie beyond, is to risk much in the way 
of additional co-operation by the United States in 
the defence of our country, as well as their own, 
and to convey to American citizens generally a 
wholly erroneous impression, especially, where, 
as of present, they are sending troops and ships 
and men to the United Kingdom, to Australia, 
New Zealand and India. This is a very serious 
ground of misunder-standing to permit to 
continue for any length of time.17
 So, while Canadian officers sought to deflect 
requests for air force assistance, King told his 
caucus on 27 May Canadian soldiers might be 
needed in Alaska, adding three days later the 
Japanese might “get a very considerable foothold 
on parts of Alaska and even BC.”18 Upon hearing 
of Japanese air raids upon the eastern Aleutian 
base of Dutch Harbor on 3 June, though he 
feared the Canadian public would “be in a state 
of consternation over the Japanese being able 
to establish bases in Alaska which would enable 
them to attack our country and to prepare for 
its invasion,” King felt great relief “to find how 
completely the thing I have fought for all along 
has been justified.” However, he also lambasted 
Canadian military commanders:
As a matter of fact, our people have left Canada’s 
position very much that of the position at 
Singapore, basing their view on Hitler being the 
only one to defeat and the security of outlying 
parts. BC is pretty much today as Singapore. 
We have been directing all our attention toward 
fighting the battle on another front, and left the 
back door completely opened for the enemy to 
come in from that side.19
 King’s gloom dissipated once Roosevelt told 
him on 25 June that Japan’s occupation of the 
western Aleutians was not as a preliminary step 
towards a major assault upon North America, an 
opinion also offered by British Field Marshal Sir 
John Dill when he met with King in Ottawa on 
12 July. So, as Japan consolidated its Aleutian 
Norman Robertson (left), the under-secretary of state for 
external affairs, believed that a Canadian role in Alaska 
might balance a politically worrying American presence 
in Canada’s northwest on projects like the Alaska 
Highway. J.L. Ralston, the minister of national defence, 
also supported the Aleutians operation, but feared the 
military would make committments to the US without his 
full knowledge.
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foothold, by September 1942 Canadian planes 
were raiding Kiska and Attu. In August 1942 the 
RCN allocated five ships to the Aleutians, telling 
naval minister Angus Macdonald only as the 
vessels were about to sail. Though he released 
the vessels, an indignant Macdonald limited 
their tactical independence and informed a 
disappointed USN no additional ships would be 
forthcoming. Irate, King complained Canadian 
officers had no right to make such commitments 
without prior CWC permission. He did not object 
to modest assistance for Alaska; indeed, on 4 
September his government sent three small anti-
aircraft units to Alaska. What King wanted the 
military to understand was that the CWC required 
the full details of all operations “in which 
Canadian assistance had been requested.”20
 King’s demand for full and timely disclosures 
figured prominently when Aleutian operations 
came up again in May 1943. American forces had 
crept westward in the Aleutians, seizing islands 
and building support bases for the eventual 
recapture of Attu and Kiska. The American 
services had engaged in often heated arguments 
amongst themselves and with the British about 
Pacific operational prospects. The argument 
reached the boiling point when the Combined 
Chiefs met at Casablanca in January 1943. 
Convinced that his officers had overestimated 
Japan’s military capabilities and that plans to 
use the Aleutians to assault the Kurile Islands 
might seriously delay the invasion of western 
Europe, General George C. Marshall watered 
down a proposal to retake the western Aleutians 
as soon as possible in favour of “operations to 
make the Aleutians as secure as possible.”21 
Marshall’s restrictions and USN concerns about 
the size of Alaska’s garrison was a major problem 
for DeWitt. Though Alaska’s authorized garrison 
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was 110,000 soldiers, many of the men were air 
corps personnel and support troops tasked with 
maintaining the overstretched communications 
lines. Though the Joint Chiefs had said this 
ceiling could be exceeded for approved offensive 
operations, on 19 April 1943 they offered DeWitt 
only two additional infantry regiments for action 
in the Aleutians. Seeking more combat troops, 
DeWitt told Major-General George Pearkes in 
Vancouver on 19 April that Attu’s invasion was 
imminent and that an operation against Kiska 
was likely by summer’s end. Removed against 
his will from a divisional command in Britain in 
1942, Pearkes enthusiastically desired a role at 
Kiska and offered an observer team for Attu.22
 Stuart did not act until after Pope reported 
that State Department official John Hickerson 
had lobbied him on 8 May for a token Canadian 
army role in the Aleutians. Hickerson’s judgment 
“that such an invitation would be gratefully 
accepted” was dead on. As the Canadian army’s 
sole combat role since the December 1941 defeat 
at Hong Kong had been the calamitous Dieppe 
raid in August 1942, Stuart was now keen to 
act in the Pacific. So when Pearkes reported 
back on 25 May that DeWitt wanted either a 
battalion-sized garrison force for the western 
Aleutians or a brigade group ready by 1 August 
for an amphibious landing, on the morning 
of 26 May Stuart presented Ralston with five 
reasons for accepting both suggestions: troops 
would gain combat experience; army prestige 
and morale would be enhanced; using home 
defence conscripts in an active theatre would 
lessen hostile public opinion towards the so-
called “Zombies”; removing enemy forces from 
American soil would improve relations with 
Washington; and participation coincided with 
PJBD continental defence plans.23
 With no time for Ralston to digest the 
subtleties of Stuart’s case, the minister and 
the general rushed off to a CWC meeting where 
Ralston, after a brief introduction, gave way so the 
CGS could make his pitch. King said very little 
about Stuart’s proposal during the CWC meeting, 
but in his diary that night he was not so reticent. 
King was quite displeased Ralston had not 
brought the matter to the Cabinet table, especially 
Canadian soldiers from Le Régiment de Hull, a French-speaking unit, board US Navy transports bound for Kiska.
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as the CWC had once more warned the chiefs of 
staff on 18 May about keeping the government 
informed of all relevant military information in 
a timely manner. Perhaps even more galling, 
King and Stuart had met on 25 May to discuss 
Canadian participation in the impending invasion 
of Sicily, and the general had said nothing about 
the Aleutians. Ever suspicious, King rightly 
determined that Ralston had not known about 
the Aleutian initiative, and feared Stuart had 
initiated contact with DeWitt without Ralston’s 
authorization or prior knowledge.24
 Yet when the CWC reconvened the next day, 
King’s anger had largely dissipated thanks to the 
efforts of Norman Robertson. Still concerned 
by the growing American presence in northwest 
Canada and the political implications of that 
presence, Robertson thought sending forces 
to the Aleutians would deflect Australian 
demands for a Canadian military role in the 
south Pacific, enhance Canada’s standing in the 
United States, and counter American activities 
on Canadian soil. Frequently quoting from 
Robertson’s carefully phrased memorandum, 
King conditionally supported an Aleutian role 
as long as it would not hinder attempts to 
reinforce Canadian units in Britain. Anxious 
that another military failure could damage his 
government disproportionately while success 
might bring far too little credit, and claiming no 
knowledge of Anglo-American planning for the 
Pacific theatre, the prime minister insisted that 
final approval from the CWC would come only 
after Roosevelt formally asked for Canadian 
participation. When Power, whose son had been 
captured at Hong Kong, thought the garrison 
option sounded too dangerously like the British 
request that had led to that embarrassing defeat, 
Stuart quickly repeated that he had made no 
prior commitments to the Americans. Appeased, 
the CWC promised to grant consent only only if 
Roosevelt or Secretary of War Henry Stimson 
personally invited Canada to send troops to the 
Aleutians. The matter was anything but settled. 
Directed to extract the American invitation, Pope 
complied but complained bitterly it would be 
“more consonant with our self-interest to let the 
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Americans know that we wanted to play our part 
in the expedition rather than to seek lamely the 
‘cover’ of an invitation from them.” Stimson sent 
the desired invitation on 29 May but insisted that 
planning had to be handled through military, not 
governmental, channels. The American army 
also overcame USN objections that Canadian 
participation was an obvious attempt to subvert 
Alaska’s garrison ceiling lacking any apparent 
“great political benefits.”25
 King may have misled his advisers about his 
knowledge of Allied planning for the war with 
Japan. He had been present in Washington on 20 
May when Roosevelt had discussed Attu (attacked 
by American forces on 11 May) and had alluded 
to a possible operation against Kiska. Indeed, 
when queried by Roosevelt as to what he thought, 
King had welcomed “every 
measure to evict the Japanese 
from the Aleutian Area.” Perhaps 
King had forgotten that meeting; 
more likely he had chosen to 
forget so as not to buttress 
Stuart’s position, a position 
King liked less and less after 27 
May. On 28 May a livid Ralston 
burst into King’s office to reveal 
that some journalists had just 
informed him Canadian troops 
were already on Attu. Viewing 
this as “an alarming development 
in that it indicated that the army 
are going ahead with operations 
without the Cabinet having even 
sanctioned them,” King heartily 
approved Ralston’s decision to 
call Stuart upon the carpet for 
this distressing revelation. That 
evening a browbeaten Stuart 
explained there was only a 
small team of observers on Attu, 
calming King’s fears that the 
army had covertly initiated a full-scale operation 
without his knowledge. Stuart promised never 
again to discuss military operations without 
obtaining political approval, blamed Pearkes for 
exceeding his instructions, and accepted King’s 
demand that no further Aleutian troop transfers 
would occur without prior Cabinet approval.26
 By the next morning, as he pored through 
communications about the bloody combat 
ongoing at Attu, King entertained serious second 
thoughts about sending Canadian soldiers to 
the Aleutians. “Incensed that our forces should 
have been drawn into this business without the 
Minister of Defence or myself,” King mused that 
he would have cancelled “the whole thing” had 
the matter not already come to the attention of 
the American army chief of staff, General George 
This official Canadian Army Photo was 
released to the press with the following 
caption:
“Sleeping quarters are a bit cramped, 
but these Canadian troops, bound for 
high adventure in the Aleutians, take it 
as all a part of the show as they await 
the sailing of their transport vessel 
northwards towards Kiska where 
they are now in action against the 
Japanese.”
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C. Marshall. To abort the initiative now could 
engender serious problems with Canadian-
American military cooperation in the Pacific 
and might force Stuart’s resignation, no small 
concern as the Quebec-born Stuart was the 
rarest of Canadian generals, an officer opposed 
to conscription for overseas service. Hopeful “the 
whole business has been caught just in time,” 
and believing that doing anything else “would 
have made the situation worse,” King consoled 
himself that Canadian participation in Aleutian 
operations would be of “national value” as it 
would prevent the United States from seeking 
to take all the credit for safeguarding the North 
American west coast.27
 King’s acquiescence came at a steep price. 
Stuart had dropped DeWitt’s garrison proposal 
as administratively unworkable, but when 
Ralston accepted Stimson’s Kiska invitation, he 
insisted final approval of the actual despatch of 
the Canadian brigade group, Greenlight Force, 
would be “subject to the satisfactory completion” 
of the military plans. Thus, the CWC instructed 
a horrified Pope to obtain a copy of the formal 
American directive authorizing Kiska’s invasion 
so it could determine if the operation was likely to 
succeed. Although the American Joint Chiefs let 
Pope examine the document, they firmly declined 
to release it to Ottawa unless the CWC promised 
to severely restrict its circulation. This difficult 
matter was resolved only when the CWC dropped 
its demand to see the actual document after Pope 
found the plan militarily acceptable.28
 Pope was appalled by this tiresome “constant 
hunting for cover” which he felt cast serious and 
embarrassing doubts upon American military 
abilities. Pope was mistaken. After Hong Kong 
and Dieppe, the CWC was far more concerned 
about Canadian military competence than any 
perceived American martial inefficiency. As the 
1942 Royal Commission that had studied the 
Hong Kong debacle had noted 120 soldiers had 
been despatched to that doomed colony without 
adequate training, King’s government insisted 
that all Kiska-bound soldiers had to have six 
months training by 1 August 1943, later revised 
to four months when Pearkes insisted a six-
month rule would greatly impair the brigade’s 
formation.29 Greenlight Force’s administrative 
history admits one third of every brigade unit 
had to be replaced thanks to an inadequate 
army medical boarding system, an abundance of 
over-age and inefficient officers, and the army’s 
policy of treating home defence formations as 
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Canadian and US Forces land unopposed on Kiska, 16 August 1943. Hundreds of men and vehicles are visible at the 
water’s edge, while lines of troops can be seen marching in single files up the draws leading from the beach.
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reinforcement pools rather than as proper units 
destined one day to see real combat. Le Régiment 
de Hull, seven officers short when the process 
began, lost 21 more including its commander 
in the reorganization. Prior to 9 July the army 
ordered Pearkes to confirm on three separate 
occasions that the remaining men were fit for 
combat. Despite all these efforts, when the 
troops shipped out on 12 July, 26 insufficiently 
trained men had to be left behind on the dock. 
One disgruntled company from the Winnipeg 
Grenadiers nearly mutinied, numerous men were 
absent without leave, and some apprehended 
deserters had to be put aboard their transports 
at gunpoint.30
 But the CWC would not authorize Greenlight’s 
final move to Kiska until Major-General J.C. 
Murchie had personally judged the brigade’s 
readiness and deemed the tactical plan 
acceptable. Murchie arrived on Adak Island on 
6 August, but informed Ottawa all was well only 
on the evening of 11 August, just hours before 
the expedition’s departure for Kiska. Owing to 
time zone differences and the need to decode 
Murchie’s detailed message before Ottawa could 
reply, Pearkes found himself in a most awkward 
position on 12 August; some ships had already 
left for Kiska and he still had no authorization 
to let Greenlight go. Fortunately Ottawa’s 
affirmative answer reached Pearkes before the 
first Canadians were slated to depart.31 This 
final problem left a bitter taste. Pope opined 
that Murchie’s inspection had been a travesty. 
Either Canada wanted to drive Japan from the 
Aleutians or it did not; if it did then it should 
have accepted American direction. Pearkes 
complained the embarrassing delay had put him 
in a “most unfair” position, though he admitted 
later that he would have sent the troops without 
authorization rather than risk the expedition to 
Kiska.32 Certainly both generals had a point for 
the CWC had put them in difficult positions, but 
it is hard to sympathize with Pearkes as he had 
secretly negotiated with DeWitt to force King to 
accept a fait accompli. One doubts Ralston and 
King thought they could derail a major military 
endeavour at the very last moment, but that 
possibility cannot be ruled out either. It certainly 
was not one of Canada’s finer moments, and 
clearly illustrated that Canadian civil-military 
relations in 1943 were at a dangerously low ebb.
 The actual mechanisms involved in the 
difficult and complex task of forming Greenlight 
Force, which included despatching Marine 
Corps instructors to Pacific Command to 
acquaint the Canadians with amphibious warfare 
techniques, does not seemed to have concerned 
King. His diary contains just one reference to 
Greenlight’s training, when he mistakenly noted 
on 3 July 1943 that 5,000 Canadian draftees 
had already left British Columbia for further 
instruction with American forces already present 
in the Aleutians. Rather, apprehensive that 
using draftees in combat for the first time might 
“change considerably the emotional feeling in the 
country and the situation in Parliament,” King 
hoped he would be up to the job, emotionally 
and physically, “to hold the country steady.”33 On 
15 August, as the first Canadian and American 
soldiers began splashing through the bone-
This grainy photo of the Canadian camp on Kiska captures the bleakness and desolation of the northern terrain.
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chilling surf at Kiska, King was in Quebec City, 
playing host to Franklin Roosevelt, Winston 
Churchill, and the Anglo-American Combined 
Chiefs of Staff. Excluded from the meetings of 
real substance, King greeted news of the landings 
“with intense interest” and desired to broadcast 
the operation’s significance to the Canadian 
people. While King, according to Pope, “wished 
to go to bat” on 15 August, the American military 
permitted no announcement until all landing 
operations at Kiska had been completed, a 
restriction not lifted until 20 August.34 The lack of 
Japanese opposition was puzzling though. When 
King met with Churchill on 16 August, the British 
leader wondered (correctly) if the Japanese 
garrison “had left the place.” Unable to imagine 
that possibility, King believed the Japanese 
troops, hiding in Kiska’s rocks and caves, “would 
turn up later.” When Murchie briefed King on 17 
August, the general reassured the Prime Minister 
the splendidly conditioned Canadian soldiers on 
Kiska “were the best equipped lot of men that 
had taken part in this war anywhere,” and that 
Americans officers had praised them for their 
“skill, daring, courage and efficiency” during the 
landing and subsequent march inland.35
 Having risked considerable political capital 
by sending home defence conscripts to their first 
combat zone, King remained keen to make his 
public announcement even though the USN made 
clear on 20 August that, given the unopposed 
landing and the heavy casualties from friendly fire 
and Japanese booby-traps (four dead Canadians 
and dozens of American fatalities), it had no wish 
to publicize the operation. J.W. Pickersgill, one 
of King’s advisers, also opposed issuing a public 
statement, maintaining Canadians, expecting 
to hear “the operation had been something of a 
major character,” would “experience a sense of 
keen disappointment” once they knew the more 
prosaic truth. Pickersgill dropped his objection 
when King countered they might never again 
have an opportunity to show the extent to which 
Canadian forces had cooperated with the United 
States to protect Alaska. No doubt Pickersgill had 
seen the power of King’s wisdom or at least the 
wisdom of acknowledging King’s power! King’s 
radio statement, made on of 21 August, outlined 
the operation, mentioned the Canadian units 
involved and their commanders, emphasized the 
extensive training the brigade had undergone, 
and stoutly defended his government’s record on 
home defence and the conflict in the Pacific.36 
 While Stacey labels Kiska’s invasion a 
“fiasco” and “a ridiculous anti-climax,” Pearkes 
and Stuart hoped the operation would act 
A Canadian soldier catches a quick catnap before boarding the transport which will take him to Kiska.
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as a springboard for even more ambitious 
plans. On 31 May Stuart had initiated “Poppy,” 
a study about employing Canadian troops 
in the Aleutians, on mainland Asia, and in 
the southwest Pacific. Furthermore, he had 
demanded that the staff officers involved in the 
planning should shun official communications 
channels and the military’s official filing system,37 
truly extraordinary measures that might indicate 
Stuart was playing a dangerous game just days 
after his dressing down by Ralston and King. 
Pearkes was even more reckless. On 5 July, 
after DeWitt had mentioned moving against the 
Kuriles Islands in 1944, he and Pearkes had 
promised to keep talking about Canada’s future 
role in the Pacific. Murchie had cautioned Pearkes 
that such plans were for the CWC to consider. 
That warning had no effect. Days later Pearkes 
stated Kiska was the “first step to Tokyo and that 
Canada should be prepared to follow it up and 
stay with it to the end,” and Greenlight would 
“be the forerunner of larger expeditions from 
Pacific Command.”38 By early August, envisaging 
three Canadian brigades for the Kuriles, Pearkes 
naively claimed that he had not the slightest 
idea what King wanted, and planning had to 
begin immediately. To speed up the process, 
Pearkes had suggested wintering Greenlight in 
the Aleutians, parcelling its units out later to 
train the Kurile force.39 Intent on meeting those 
desires, on 30 August Stuart asked the CWC to 
retain three brigades in Pacific Command in case 
the Pacific conflict unexpectedly deteriorated and 
to serve as reinforcements pools for Europe. As 
Greenlight’s fine performance at Kiska might 
prompt Washington to ask Canada for further 
assistance in the Pacific, unless the formation 
was maintained the CGS pointed out it might 
take eight months to reform disbanded units, a 
delay that might prove most embarrassing.40
 Stuart’s ideas had support. Just days 
before Roosevelt had noted Germany’s ultimate 
defeat would allow the Allies, including 
Canada, to transfer more military resources 
to the fight against Japan. Even the RCN, 
focussed on its brutal battle with Germany, was 
contemplating extensive Pacific operations so 
that it might acquire cruisers, aircraft carriers, 
and a prestigious blue water fleet status.41 
H.L. Keenleyside of the DEA also advocated a 
wider Canadian role in the Pacific. A “northern 
nationalist” who believed Canada’s future “lay 
in the responsible development of the northern 
frontier,” Keenleyside had been struck by the 
sheer scale, intensity, and permanence of the 
American effort in Canada’s northwest. Worried 
46,000 static Canadian troops in the region 
could not balance the more dynamic American 
presence, Keenleyside wanted a visible part in 
north Pacific operations to demonstrate Canada 
deserved a real voice in determining a prostrate 
Japan’s postwar future.42 King, however, was 
in no mood to accept any more military advice. 
When the CWC discussed potential participation 
in Kurile operations on 8 September, King 
dispensed with the army’s plans. Although 
accepting the need to retain adequate reserves in 
Pacific Command for unexpected eventualities, 
King rebuked the military for seeking substantial 
commitments when Canada was heavily engaged 
in Europe. But after Ralston defended Stuart, 
the ministers declined to make any decision. 
When the matter came up again on 12 October, 
King said little as Ralston and Stuart quarrelled 
about Greenlight Force. Ralston suggested leaving 
a small force behind in the Aleutians over the 
winter to represent Canada’s continued interest 
in the north Pacific, but Stuart pushed for the 
entire brigade to be returned to Canada for 
retraining for possible future operations. The 
ministers agreed. As Power put it, the period 
of active north Pacific operations was over and 
all the soldiers should come home by January 
1944.43
 Canada’s mixed record of involvement in 
Aleutian operations strongly influenced King’s 
attitude towards the Pacific conflict until Japan’s 
surrender in 1945. On 1 December the Canadian 
leader noted in his diary that Roosevelt and 
Churchill had gone too far by publicly announcing 
Japan would be stripped of its colonies at the 
war’s end. This declaration would leave Japan 
little choice but to keep fighting, which might 
mean Canada coming “into the war against Japan 
on a larger scale than has been intended.” Just 
over a month later, King and Power discussed 
a possible Canadian contribution to the final 
invasion of Japan. Power wanted to send 60 
RCAF squadrons, but recalling Hong Kong and 
the Aleutians, King worried most Canadians 
would be unenthusiastic. Certain “there was 
really no place for sending any army over the 
Pacific” and that Canada would “get little credit 
for anything” it might do from its allies, the 
war-weary leader reluctantly accepted Canada’s 
“obligation to share” in Japan’s defeat.44 
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 Determining the extent of Canada’s share 
was not easy. Britain, which wanted Dominion 
help to recover its lost Asian possessions, sought 
indications such assistance might be forthcoming. 
But taking exception to Lord Halifax’s public 
advocation of a united imperial foreign policy 
in Toronto in late January 1944, an irate King 
ordered Power, Robertson, and Privy Council 
clerk A.D.P. Heeney to draft a response. That 
document, ready by 10 February and carefully 
vetted by King, insisted Canada’s commitment 
to the war with Japan would be determined by 
its status as a Pacific nation, its Commonwealth 
membership, a desire to defeat Japan, and its 
“close friendship and common interest with the 
United States.” As a northwestern route across 
Canada to Japan might become important, it 
might be “advisable for Canada to play her part 
in the Japanese war in very close cooperation 
with the United States, at any rate in certain 
operational areas.”45 Concerted British and 
Australian efforts to alter King’s mind at a 
meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in 
London in May 1944 failed utterly. King was 
surprised to discover the British had not been 
able “to figure out just what was needed” to fight 
Japan, the result of a bitter battle within Britain’s 
Cabinet between advocates of a strong military 
effort against Japan and those wanting to speedily 
rebuild Britain’s battered civilian economy. 
Declining to support Australian Prime Minister 
John Curtin’s demands for improved imperial 
consultative machinery for the Pacific war and 
the postwar period, noting neither British nor 
Canadian plans had been finalized, King refused 
to sign a statement that the Commonwealth had 
devised a common strategy to fight Germany and 
Japan. Adding insult to injury, King declared that 
as Canadian forces had been cooperating with 
their American counterparts to secure the north 
Pacific and the Aleutians, it “might be thought 
wise in the strategy of war for us to continue in 
that way and when attacking Japan.”46
 In the end, King’s assertion held; despite the 
strenuous efforts of the British, the RCAF, the 
RCN, and some Cabinet ministers, most notably 
navy minister Angus Macdonald, Canada opted 
to fight in the northern Pacific and to attach 
an army division to American forces slated to 
invade Japan in 1945-46. Nor did King relax 
his control over the process. When Roosevelt 
suggested deploying Canadian troops to China 
in March 1945, King indignantly complained 
about the President proposing “anything of the 
kind.” Then when the British asked Ottawa in 
August 1945 to let the Canadian division serve 
in an imperial corps with British and Australian 
forces, the army, which had begun equipping its 
troops with American weapons and adapting 
them to American command systems, declined. 
When Japan surrendered in mid-August, Canada 
summarily rejected two British requests to 
include Canadian units in the recapture of Hong 
Kong and a Commonwealth occupation force for 
Japan.47 Canada’s Pacific war was over.
 King had never forgotten the Kiska episode, 
though his recall of events altered with the 
passage of time. In May 1943 his ire had been 
directed, and properly so, at Stuart and Pearkes 
for their unauthorized discussions with DeWitt. 
Yet in a bitterly reflective moment on 16 January 
1945, a tired prime minister asserted Canada 
had often got into trouble over the course of the 
war because of the overzealous conduct of some 
officials in the Department of External Affairs and 
the Department of National Defence. Certain “we 
are getting a certain kind of bureaucracy working 
out these things [policies] amongst themselves,” 
King was amazed Robertson “does not see the 
terrible import of anything of the kind.” In 
particular, King blamed Keenleyside for having 
got Canada “into the Kiska expedition business,” 
though the diary offers no further explanation 
for this harsh and mistaken judgement.48 In 
fact, Keenleyside had not initiated the despatch 
of Canadian troops to Kiska in the summer of 
1943, though he had lobbied King in July 1943 
to follow up the Kiska attack by participating 
in more American-led operations in the north 
Pacific. Certainly King knew he possessed the 
capacity for making mistakes, as he made clear 
on 1 January 1902:
This journal is strictly private, and none should 
look upon its pages save with reverent eyes, and 
a heart that can abide with silence, for its is the 
story of a human life, its ambitions, its beliefs, its 
failures & its broken achievements, all of which 
may be right or wrong, none of which are without 
their influence, and purpose for all time.49
King’s admission of the possibility of failure and 
error links him to the rest of humanity, for as 
J.M Barrie, Peter Pan’s creator, has commented, 
the”life of every man is a diary in which he means 
to write one story, and writes another; and his 
humblest hour is when he compares the volume 
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as it is with what he vowed to make it.”50 After 
getting their chance to read King’s fascinating 
diaries, Canadians might agree with Barrie.
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